About me

Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Fellow at the New America Foundation.  Research focus on participatory governance, public law (constitutional, administrative, electoral, local government), economic policy, international development.  Committed to research and practice aimed at improving democratic governance and economic welfare. (More here)

Current works in progress

  • “Constitutionalism, Progressivism, and Political Economy in the New Gilded Age”.  Draft presented at “Law and Inequality” conference, Yale Law School, October 2015.
  • Democracy against Domination: Contesting Economic Power in Progressive and Neorepublican Political Thought.”   Draft in review; presented at US Society for Intellectual History conference, Washington D.C., October 2015.
  • “Transcending the New Deal Idea of the State: Managerialism, Neoliberalism, and Participatory Democracy.”  Draft presented at “Beyond the New Deal Order” conference ,UC-Santa Barbara, September 2015. 
  • “Private Power, Public Utilities, and the ‘Curse of Bigness’ Revisited.”  Draft presented at American Political Science Association annual convention (September 2015); and American Association of Law Schools annual conference, Business Associations and Law & Economics Section, “Corporate Law and Economics Revolution 40 years Later” (January 2016).
  • “Disrupting Democracy: Accountability and Equality in the On-Demand Economy.”   Draft presented at “Approaches to Capitalism” workshop, Stanford University, November 2015.
  • “Managerialism, Structuralism, and the Competing Logics of Financial Regulation.” Draft in progress.
  • “Citizen Audits.”  Draft in progress.
  • “Regulatory Capture and Democratic Theory.” Draft in progress.
  • Democracy Against Domination: Markets, Experts, and Citizens in Economic Governance. Book manuscript, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Brief abstracts below the fold.

Continue reading “Current works in progress”

Domination, democracy, and constitutional political economy

Reflections on Progressive Era political thought, new debates over constitutional political economy and economic inequality, and the Texas Law Review symposium on Fishkin and Forbath’s forthcoming Constitution of Opportunity.  Posted on Balkinization:

  1. Constitutional political economy in the New Gilded Age: A revival of legal realism? (Monday, January 25, 2016).
  2. What is “constitutional” about “constitutional political economy”? (Wednesday, February 3, 2016).

Boston Review Forum: “Curbing the New Corporate Power”

How should we understand and control the new forms of corporate power emerging in the sharing economy and the Internet Age? This cover article for the Boston Review forum explores the challenge of corporate power today, drawing on insights from Progressive Era reforms to outline some ways forward.

Main article online here.

Plus great responses and discussion from Richard White, Juliet Schor, Mike Konzcal, Arun Sundararajan, and more. My response to critics online here.

Democracy Against Domination: Markets, Experts, and Citizens in Economic Governance

[Forthcoming, Oxford University Press]


The 2008 financial crisis provoked a debate over how we as a democratic society ought to govern the modern market economy.  Our prevailing response to this problem of economic governance has been to appeal either to free markets as self-regulating, self-optimizing systems, or to technocratic rule by neutral experts.  Both these systems are appealing because they claim to promote the public good free of the corruption, irrationality, conflict, and vagaries of democratic politics.  This project aims to overcome this skepticism to sketch an account of a democratic approach to economic governance, inspired by the thought and reforms of the Progressive Era.

Continue reading “Democracy Against Domination: Markets, Experts, and Citizens in Economic Governance”

“Democracy and Productivity: The Glass-Steagall Act and the Shifting Discourse of Financial Regulation”

Journal of Policy History, 24:4 (Fall 2012), pp. 612-643

Available online here.  Download from SSRN  here.


In the fall of 2008, the United States experienced a sudden financial crisis that plunged the financial sector into disarray, provoked the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, and gave rise to an ongoing series of highly contentious debates over economic regulation. Two years later, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, one of the largest overhauls of financial regulation in history. Throughout this debate, much of the discourse of financial reform revolved around concepts such as consumer protection, the problem of the “systemic risk” posed by the failure of financial institutions that could have vast negative spillover effects, and the clash between proponents and critics of expanded federal regulatory oversight. But despite deep-seated public anger against financial firms and accusations of abusive practices of securitization and subprime mortgage lending, the public discourse of reform politics exhibited little evidence of more aggressive arguments against the concentrated economic and political power of big finance—arguments that had historically animated antitrust and financial reformers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 This current era of ongoing debate over the role of the state in regulating the financial sector suggests an opportune moment to reexamine the language and arguments of an earlier era of financial regulatory reform: the debate around the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. …

The reform discourse in Congress surrounding Glass-Steagall parallels many of the debates in our current historical moment. Then, as now, policy- makers struggled to conceptualize the precise nature of the economic challenge and how reforms ought to respond. Then, as now, the dominant narrative was primarily one where reforms were targeted toward promoting economic productivity and stability. Yet at the same time, there was a strong undercurrent of a more aggressive and moralized critique of financial greed and excessive power. This historical debate around Glass-Steagall from 1931 to 1933 is especially interesting because it captures an important shift in discourses of reform, from earlier Progressive Era reform discourses to the kinds of language that would mark the New Deal and postwar eras—a shift that would ultimately have profound consequences for more recent debates on financial regulation.